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Narrow Electoral Selection
Does power persist within families? This article considers whether members of
the UK House of Commons with longer legislative careers after 1832 were more likely
to establish a political dynasty. Tenure can create opportunities to promote relatives. A
regression discontinuity design for re-election races helps to rule out the confounding
influence of inheritable traits. There is no evidence for a causal effect of tenure length
on establishing or continuing a dynasty. Established families may have constrained fur-
ther dynasty development, explaining the null result of tenure.
In the 19th century, UK parliamentary politics was dominated by a
few established families. The peerages of the House of Lords were
bequeathed from generation to generation. The House of Commons too
was dominated by a few landowning families (Canandine 1999). During
that century power would gradually shift away from these aristocratic
elites along with widening democratic participation. Political dynasties
seemingly became part of the past: The number of MPs from the same
families declined over time. However, they never disappeared entirely:
Certain political dynasties survived, and some new entrants would see
relatives entering in their footsteps. Does power then still persist within
families in democracies?
Dynastic succession occurs in all professions. However, for the
profession of politics in democracies succession is not organized along
dynastic lines but depends on running successful electoral campaigns.
Understanding whether political power can still be bequeathed through
elections is then particularly important. The tension between dynastic
persistence and democratic representation has long been a central
concern for political science (Michels [1911] 1968; Mosca [1896] 1939).
Yet identifying what constitutes such power bequests in democracies is
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difﬁcult. Elections (or peerages in the United Kingdom) are not won at
random. The same talents or drive that voters appreciate in the founders
of the dynasty may explain the election of their successors. In spite of
these challenges to identifying an effect of holding power on transmit-
ting power to relatives, recent research provides evidence for such a
causal connection by exploiting exogenous sources of power (Dal Bo,
Dal Bo, and Snyder 2009; Querubin 2015; Rossi 2015). One such identi-
ﬁed cause of dynasties is the tenure length of a politician. Holding power
for longer may create advantages for relatives such as name recognition
or an extensive political network that are independent from ﬁxed charac-
teristics shared within families, such as peerages and landholdings of
prominent families in the UK context.
This article considers what evidence there is in the United King-
dom for a tenure effect on dynasty formation as has been found for the
United States (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder 2009). Surprisingly, in light
of many historical anecdotes of its powerful families, I ﬁnd no evidence
in favor of power bequest through elections in 19th-century United
Kingdom, nor afterwards. Employing a regression discontinuity design
to close re-elections, I ﬁnd that MPs who served longer were no more or
less likely to establish or continue a political dynasty. A breakup of the
analysis over different time periods provides qualitatively similar results:
throughout the 19th century, or even beyond until as recently as 2001,
there is little evidence for power bequest through elections.
This null result of narrow electoral selection means that tenure
does not cause dynastic power to persist in the United Kingdom, at least
not for marginally re-elected individuals who served longer due to good
fortune at the polls. Having several senior relatives as well as the total
number of years of political experience in the family, while not distribut-
ed at random among MPs, are much stronger predictors of dynasty
formation than tenure, and the probability of continuing the dynasty for
such junior relatives is not signiﬁcantly increased or decreased by
narrowly winning a ﬁrst re-election. Perhaps power bequest did not
occur through parliamentary service. Throughout the 19th century, pow-
er became increasingly concentrated in the cabinet, shifting away from
individual MPs and parliament (Cox 1987). Therefore, the success of the
relatives of cabinet ministers is one obvious way to study the importance
of having relevant political connections. I ﬁnd that junior dynastic MPs
were more likely to obtain a cabinet position, but only conditional on
being the political heir of an MP who had previously served in the
cabinet. While selection to the cabinet is not random, cabinet service
forms a good predictor of starting a dynasty, and there is no heteroge-
nous effect of tenure length for these future cabinet ministers. While
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there was no purely electoral advantage to bequeath, new dynasties still
emerged while old ones managed to survive. One way in which they
may have done so was by selecting their scions into the cabinet.
Political dynasties appear to be present in all democracies. Yet in
contrast to results in the existing literature (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder
2009; Querubin 2015; Rossi 2015), I do not ﬁnd an effect of tenure. This
null result suggests that electoral success of newcomers does not always
lead to advantages for their relatives. To understand the causes of
political dynasties, we therefore must pay attention to existing institu-
tions and the role of established elites.
Political Dynasties in Democracies
Early work in political science noted the tendency for dynasties
to form even in democratic systems (Michels [1911] 1968; Mosca
[1896] 1939). How and why democratic systems provide opportunities
for dynastic domination by political elites is still relevant to researchers
because of adverse selection concerns (e.g., Besley 2005). The identity
of policy makers tends to inﬂuence the types of policies they imple-
ment (Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2013; Pande 2003), and
legislative careers may be particularly rewarding (Eggers and Hainmu-
eller 2009, 2013, 2014; Querubin and Snyder 2009, 2013).1 Voters
may reward politicians from established families for perceived shared
talent or drive, and this may make them more successful than uncon-
nected newcomers. Evidence from India, the United States, the
Philippines, Japan, and Belgium indicates that junior members of polit-
ical families indeed tend to amass more votes behind their names even
after controlling for other factors, making them more likely to win elec-
toral contests (Bohlken and Chandra 2015; Cruz, Labonne, and
Querubin 2015; Feinstein 2010; Querubin 2015; Smith 2012; Van
Coppenolle 2014). Children of narrowly elected Swedish mayors were
also found to have higher yearly earnings on average (Folke, Persson,
and Rickne 2015). The presence of political dynasties in democracies
can also indicate elite entrenchment. Elites may search for ways to sur-
vive in captured democracies (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). In
spite of the challenges to identify such power perpetuation among
elites, recent work employing exogenous shocks to tenure length has
found evidence of dynastic power perpetuation in the contexts of the
United States, Argentina, and the Philippines (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and
Snyder 2009; Rossi 2015; Querubin 2015). Moreover, the extent to
which dynastic elites can thrive in democracies, or political concentra-
tion, has been shown to be related to the initial distribution of wealth
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among elites (Rossi 2011) and has been found to affect current eco-
nomic outcomes (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Ferraz and Finan 2009).
By employing a similar causal identiﬁcation strategy to identify
whether a United States-like power effect (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder
2009) exists in the United Kingdom, the results of this article are closely
comparable to those of other settings. The unexpected null result indi-
cates that context matters for dynastic persistence and is therefore
relevant for understanding political dynasties beyond the United
Kingdom. Political dynasties have been shown to thrive in different insti-
tutional contexts and, across time, their presence may appear to be
unrelated to the existing institutional setup of a country. However, the
results of this article suggest that the mechanisms underlying dynastic
persistence could vary. In recent work, Fiva and Smith (2015) also found
no evidence of power perpetuation in Norway, and they relate this to the
party-centered system. Dynastic persistence could be more common in
electoral systems that encourage a personal vote (Smith 2012). Other
work has found that particular institutional changes can have no, or even
counterproductive, effects on the persistence of political dynasties. For
example, there is no evidence for an effect of franchise extension on
the electoral success of dynastic candidates in the United Kingdom
(Berlinski, Dewan, and Van Coppenolle 2014), while the introduction of
term limits in the Philippines further encouraged dynastic persistence
(Querubin 2011). A move away from elections that insulated appoint-
ments of aldermen from the democratic process has been found to lead
to an increase in the number of local dynastic politicians in Italy (Geys
2015). Beyond the causes of dynasties, there is also some recent work
on the differences in the behavior of these politicians: Dynastic politi-
cians do not necessarily increase the quality of public services
(Braganc¸a, Ferraz, and Rios 2015), though they could channel more
funds to their districts (Asako et al. 2015). There is little evidence so far
for differences among dynastic legislators: for example, female dynastic
mayors in the Philippines do not behave differently from male dynastic
mayors once in ofﬁce (Labonne, Parsa, and Querubin 2015). While
dynasties are common in different democratic countries, the results of
my article suggest that what causes the extent of this phenomenon may
be dependent on the underlying institutional context and the role of
already established elites.
Data
The biographical data for this study report individual characteris-
tics for all members of the UK House of Commons elected in general
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elections since 1832 up to and including 2005. Every MP has a parlia-
mentary service record, indicating the date of entry and exit into the
House of Commons for each constituency the MP has served and their
party label. There is also a record of individual characteristics for each
MP, including their date of birth, date of death, education, professional
occupation before entering parliament, whether they had aristocratic
connections, and information about their dynastic links to other MPs.
The information originated from biographies, in particular Stenton and
Lees’s (1976, 1978, 1979, 1981)Who’s Who of British Members of Par-
liament.2 All available information about dynastic links between MPs
was used, ensuring that if an MP was reported to have a dynastic link to
another MP, that person would also be inversely linked to the ﬁrst MP.3
The data set does not report the links between MPs and peers explicitly,
but we do know whether an MP was connected to the aristocracy.4 A
randomly drawn subsample of 823 individuals from across all time peri-
ods5 was checked against publicly available information about family
links.6 The checked sample conﬁrmed that the information about family
links from the biographies is of good quality and quite complete, espe-
cially for close dynastic links (fathers, sons, and brothers). To ascertain
that the full universe of MPs after 1832 was covered, the original data
were matched to a list of elected MPs from Craig (1971, 1983, 1984,
1989a, 1989b). I checked whether the correct number of individuals was
returned for each constituency after 1918.7 For each missing individual,
additional information about parliamentary service, aristocratic connec-
tions, and dynastic links was collected.8 Next, the cabinet ministers in
the sample were identiﬁed by matching the names to a list of cabinet
ministers from Cook and Keith (1975), Butler and Butler (2000), and
Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2012). The ﬁnal data cover all MPs
elected in general elections.9 Finally, I matched MPs to the results of
their ﬁrst re-election attempts. The ﬁrst re-election attempt of an MP is
deﬁned as the ﬁrst general election in which theMP stands as a candidate
after winning his ﬁrst general election and serving in parliament. The
main close re-election sample used in this article is limited to elections
up to and including the December 1910 general election to allow for suf-
ﬁcient time for the MPs’ offspring to appear in parliament. The choice of
this date as end point in the analysis also makes the results closely com-
parable to the United States (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder 2009), an
interesting point of reference for that time period. An extension of this
sample for ﬁrst re-elections up to 2001 is made to test whether the effect
remains robustly null throughout the 20th century.
Political dynasties have primarily been a 19th-century phenome-
non in the United Kingdom (Figure 1). At the start of the period under
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study, the proportion of MPs establishing or continuing a dynasty was
almost 50%. However, even in the 19th century the trend for this propor-
tion of senior MPs was already clearly downward. Their presence in
parliament has declined over time to such a degree that this particular
type of MP seems to be almost extinct now. A similar ﬁgure for the pro-
portion of cabinet ministers with dynastic links conﬁrms the picture that
the 19th century was more the age of dynasties than the 20th (see Figure
2). However, compared to Figure 1, we can observe that the proportions
of cabinet ministers who were dynastic are even larger than the propor-
tions of MPs who were dynastic over time. Note that this ﬁgure does not
include cabinet ministers drawn from the House of Lords (who may have
entered the cabinet after inheriting their peerages). This ﬁgure seems to
suggest that there were additional advantages for power bequest beyond
elections and length of service in the cabinet. However, election to the
Commons and selection to a cabinet position is not random.10 In the next
section, I discuss the identiﬁcation strategy.
Empirical Strategy
As name recognition advantages and more established political
networks increase with longer tenure, we can expect an MP’s probability
FIGURE 1
Evolution of Political Dynasties
Note: Proportions of juniors (seniors) cannot be perfectly observed at the start and end of the
data.
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of establishing a dynasty, that is, of becoming a senior, to increase as
the MP serves longer. However, members with longer tenures may
be different from members with fewer terms in various ways that
may confound the effect of a longer parliamentary service alone. To
identify the effect of tenure length alone, I employ a regression dis-
continuity design that considers only those ﬁrst re-elections where
the outcome was very close. The identifying assumption is that those
MPs who narrowly won their ﬁrst re-election attempt are in no par-
ticular way different from those MPs who narrowly lost.11 To
consider whether serving longer increases the probability of estab-
lishing a dynasty, I employ a regression discontinuity design to these
close ﬁrst re-elections (f).12 I estimate the following reduced-form
model for observations near the zero vote margin:
PðseniorÞi5b11b2winfi;c;p1b3Xi1b4Xr1b5Xp1Ei (1)
with win a dummy for winners, i an indicator for the MP, c an indicator
for the constituency, p an indicator for the parliamentary term, Xi a
vector of individual characteristics for the MP, and ﬁxed effects for
regions (Xr) and parliamentary terms (Xp), respectively. Errors are
clustered at broad constituency level.13
FIGURE 2
Evolution of Political Dynasties in Cabinet
Note: Proportions of juniors (seniors) cannot be perfectly observed at the start and end of the
data.
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The identifying assumption for the causal effect of winning a ﬁrst
re-election attempt in this model relies on the idea that there are no differ-
ences between close winners and losers. However, as many
constituencies elected more than one MP in the 19th century, the loser of
the ﬁrst seat in such a constituency might still have won the second seat
and served in parliament. To ensure that the difference between winners
and losers is only tenure length, I consider only winners and losers of the
marginal seat in a constituency. Close elections are then deﬁned as those
elections for marginal seats in which the margin of vote between the
winner and the loser of that marginal seat is very small. A variable vote
margin is deﬁned as follows:
votemargini;c;p5
votesi;c;p2votesj;c;p
totalvotesc;p
(2)
with i an indicator for the MP, j an indicator for the closest candidate
the MP won or lost from, c an indicator for the constituency, and p an
indicator for the parliamentary term.
There were 2,486 contested and nonpetitioned ﬁrst re-election
attempts in general elections between 1837 and 1910, and about 69% of
these MPs also won their ﬁrst re-election attempt. This sample disregards
ﬁrst re-elections in 1835, the second parliament of the data set, and starts
with elections from the third parliament in 1837 onwards. In this way,
the effect cannot be driven by false positives (i.e., by coding many of
the MPs in the second parliament as running for re-election in the ﬁrst
general election after the start of the data set).
Table 1 shows how winners across all ﬁrst re-elections are more
likely to become seniors. Winning a ﬁrst re-election attempt is associated
with a 2.5% increase (4.3% controlling for individual covariates) in the
probability of starting (or continuing) a political dynasty. Serving at least
two terms is associated with an increased probability of establishing or
continuing a dynasty of about 7.8% (or 9.6% after adding individual
controls of Table 1). Longer tenure is clearly associated with dynasty
formation. However, these models could overestimate the true effect of
tenure if omitted variables explain why certain individuals are more like-
ly to win and serve longer as well as establish a dynasty. The RD
approach estimates a tenure effect only among comparable individuals
within small vote margins around the zero threshold who only differ
in whether they won or lost the election. When considering all ﬁrst re-
election attempts, there are important differences in terms of the charac-
teristics of the individuals returned in these races (see Table A2 in the
online supporting information). For example, junior dynastic MPs are
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more likely to have run in an unopposed ﬁrst re-election race. Therefore,
dynasties tend to run for their ﬁrst re-election in less competitive envi-
ronments, and in general MPs are not evenly distributed across race
type. Among those who run in contested elections, there is no evidence
that junior dynastic candidates performed better (the estimate for junior
regressed on vote margin is not signiﬁcant in Table A2).
For the RD approach to be reliable for estimating causal effects,
there should be no signiﬁcant differences between winners and losers
within small margins of winning or losing the marginal seat in constitu-
encies, other than winning re-election. In support of the approach, we
ﬁnd almost no differences between winners and losers that are systemati-
cally signiﬁcant across these two vote margins (see Table A3 in the
online supporting information). To address any remaining imbalances,
the proceeding analyses will include these characteristics as controls.
Moreover, Figure A2 shows that family characteristics are not signiﬁ-
cantly associated with the type of race at both sides of the discontinuity
and along the forcing variable. Another assumption is that there is no
systematic sorting of individuals around the zero vote margin, which
Figure A3 in the online supporting information supports.
I also present the results from an RD-IV estimation strategy, which
employs a two-stage instrumental variable approach using winning the
ﬁrst re-election as an instrument for serving longer.14 The dummy vari-
able longterm identiﬁes those MPs who have served two parliamentary
terms or longer. By deﬁnition, those MPs who won a ﬁrst re-election
attempt (win equals “1”) served longer. By using winning a ﬁrst
TABLE 1
OLS Results for All First Re-Elections 1837–1910
Senior
Win 0.025*
[0.015]
0.026
[0.017]
0.043***
[0.015]
Longterm 0.078***
[0.016]
0.082***
[0.018]
0.096***
[0.017]
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Juniors incl No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2,414 2,063 2,873 2,414 2,063 2,873
Note: Results of regressing senior on winning and longterm. Sample includes winners and
losers of all (unpetitioned) first re-elections. Controls as in Table A2. All models include
parliament and region fixed effects. Errors clustered at (broad) constituency level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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re-election attempt as an instrument for tenure length, we can take
account of the fact that some of those who lost their ﬁrst re-election
attempt still served more than two terms, after winning a subsequent
election.
Finally, as an alternative to comparing means at both sides of the
discontinuity within these narrow bandwiths, local linear regressions can
be estimated using different bandwidths, including an optimal band-
width (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012).
Results
To help interpretation, the following results are shown separately
after excluding or including those who were already part of existing
dynasties. The tables present the results at a 5% and a 2.5% bandwidth,
and the sample covers the years 1837 to 1910. In this way, the results are
closely comparable to the positive ﬁndings for the United States.
Main Results
Table 2 presents the differences between winners and losers of ﬁrst
close re-election attempts within a 5% and a 2.5% vote margin. The esti-
mates in all models, with or without controls, are both small and not
statistically signiﬁcant. These null results are estimated to be close to
zero, and the 95% conﬁdence intervals around these estimates allow
for an effect of up to 6% in either direction (see model 1 in Table 2).
Figure 3 further conﬁrms that there is no clear discontinuity around the
zero vote margin. Table 3 presents similar results, but this time winning
a ﬁrst re-election is employed as an instrument for the length of the
TABLE 2
Reduced-Form RD Results 1837–1910
Senior 5% 2.5%
Win 20.001
[0.031]
20.001
[0.032]
0.004
[0.030]
20.013
[0.044]
20.014
[0.045]
20.003
[0.045]
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Juniors incl No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 563 504 682 306 274 376
Note: Reduced-form regression results of senior regressed on winning. Includes winners and los-
ers of marginal seats only. Controls as in Table A3. All models include parliament and region
fixed effects. Errors clustered at (broad) constituency level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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career.15 The ﬁrst-stage results of a two-stage least-squares estimation in
the bottom half of Table 3 conﬁrm that the relevance condition holds:
Winning a marginal ﬁrst re-election attempt signiﬁcantly increases
TABLE 3
RD-IV Results 1837–1910
Senior 5% 2.5%
Longterm 20.002
[0.052]
20.002
[0.053]
0.007
[0.054]
20.022
[0.074]
20.027
[0.076]
20.006
[0.083]
First stage:
Longterm 5% 2.5%
Win 0.580***
[0.030]
0.562***
[0.030]
0.536***
[0.026]
0.569***
[0.040]
0.530***
[0.046]
0.505***
[0.037]
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Juniors incl No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 563 504 682 306 274 376
Note: Results from the 2sls RDIV estimation of senior regressed on longterm instrumented
by winning a first re-election attempt. Sample includes winners and losers of marginal seats
only. Controls as in Table A3. All models include parliament and region fixed effects. Errors
clustered at (broad) constituency level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
FIGURE 3
Senior Along Vote Margin
Note: Quadratic fit and 95% confidence interval of senior along vote margin. Sample covers
1837–1910.
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career length. However, Table 3 still shows second-stage null results
similar to those of the reduced-form approach. The effect of a long career
on the probability of establishing a political dynasty is small across all
models and cannot be distinguished from zero.
These results are also stable across bandwidths. The choice of the
bandwidth involves a trade-off between bias and variance of the esti-
mates, so Figure 4 presents the results of several local linear regressions
at different bandwidths. These estimations employ a triangular kernel
function and are shown for different multiples of the optimal bandwidth
of about 11%. For both the strategies of Tables 2 and 3, the estimates of
such alternative local linear regressions remain close to zero at different
bandwidths (the upper graphs of Figure 4).
FIGURE 4
Estimates of Local Linear Regression at Different Bandwidths
Note: Bandwidth with corresponding estimate and 95% confidence interval for local linear
regressions. Graphs depict model estimations of RD for the main sample (upper left) and RD-
IV for the main sample (upper right), RD for the full sample (lower left) and RD-IV for the full
sample (lower right). The samples include MPs who were juniors themselves, the main sample
covers the period 1837–1910, the full sample 1837–2001. The vertical line indicates the opti-
mal bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012; Nichols 2011).
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Differences Over Time
Perhaps name recognition in elections became more important as
democratic participation widened. If this is the case, we may expect the
effect to show up only in certain time periods. Therefore, I deﬁne a ﬁrst
period that starts with the election of the third parliament after the First
Reform Act of 1832, which coincides with the start of the data set. This
ﬁrst period ends right before the adoption of the Second Reform Act by
parliament in 1867, which led to the second franchise extension, and the
second period starts with the ﬁrst election run under the new franchise. A
third period begins with the ﬁrst election in 1885 after the third franchise
extension. I deﬁne a fourth period for the ﬁnal three parliaments before the
onset of World War I. Table 4 presents the reduced-form results for the
period of 1837 to 1865 (upper-left panel), 1868 to 1880 (middle-left panel),
1885 to 1900 (upper-right panel), and 1906 to 1910 (middle-right panel).
By limiting the sample to speciﬁc time periods, the number of
observations and the precision of the estimates decreases. Conclusions
from these results should therefore be drawn carefully, especially for dif-
ferences between time periods. Still, the results from Table 4 do not
conﬁrm that tenure became increasingly important over time. Before the
Third Reform Act (results in the upper-left part of Table 4) when the
franchise was most restricted, winning is estimated to have had both
positive and negative effects, and these are generally not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. After the Third Reform Act extended the franchise further, the
estimates become negative (upper half of right side of Table 4) and
sometimes even signiﬁcant for a period of time, but they change sign
and become statistically indistinguishable from zero later on (middle-
right panel). Finally, Table 4 presents results for an extended sample,
including the years 1918 to 2001. A natural breakpoint was chosen after
the end of World War II. The estimates are slightly larger for this ﬁrst
period of the 20th century, but only one is distinguishable from zero.
The positive effect of the 5% bandwidth is driven by MPs who were
already part of dynasties, and while the estimates increase somewhat in
the smaller bandwidth, they are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Local linear regressions using a triangular kernel are presented for the
full sample of 1837 to 2001 in the lower part of Figure 4. These plots fur-
ther conﬁrm that the null result holds on average in the full sample.
Interpretation of the Causally Identified Null Results
The results from Tables 2 to 4 do not allow us to conclude deﬁni-
tively that longer tenure did not matter at all for dynasty formation. The
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estimated effect is a local average treatment effect for marginal elec-
tions of the marginal seats only. The external validity of this result to
all re-elections is not straightforward. However, it is likely that the
positive effect of tenure length identiﬁed in a baseline estimation of all
these elections (see Table 1) suffers from omitted variable bias. These
causally identiﬁed null results are very different from ﬁndings for the
United States and for Argentina, which suggest an increase of about
8% on the probability of establishing a dynasty when serving at least
two terms or ﬁve additional years, respectively (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and
Snyder 2009; Rossi 2015).16 Similar random variation in tenure length
seems to produce different results in different contexts. There is no a
priori reason to believe that new entrants would not have had the same
interest in building dynasties as established elites or elites in different
countries. One explanation could be that there was less additional
name recognition to be gained from an additional parliamentary term
in the United Kingdom. If the average length of parliaments in the
United Kingdom was greater, MPs serving a ﬁrst term would have
already been better known by their constituents for their actions in
parliament. However, the average length of parliaments before 1918
in the United Kingdom was only 4.4 years compared to an average of
3 years for each term in the United States (i.e., an average of 2 years
for congressmen but 6 years for senators; see Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and
Snyder 2009, 118).
There is another possible explanation for these contrasting results,
for which I will now present some tentative evidence. Whether new
legislators can use electoral success to build political networks (e.g.,
political machines and electoral campaign strategies, a central position
within the party, etc.) depends on the extent to which existing elites are
embedded in the democratic system. The tenure effect could be depen-
dent on their informal inﬂuence. The fact that these data might
underestimate the real presence of political dynasties because they can
only discern links to other MPs, and not to peers in the House of Lords,
can be thought to support this interpretation. However, such inﬂuence is
not necessarily proxied well by their numbers only, as these were tend-
ing downwards over time. Dynasties may, for example, have been able
to inﬂuence the electoral context, as suggested by the ﬁnding that dynas-
tic candidates were more likely to run unopposed. In further support of
this interpretation, the next section describes the types of dynasties in
more detail and evaluates the evidence for a tenure effect conditional on
family type. Finally, I consider cabinet selection as an alternative mea-
sure of networks and consider the evidence for a conditional tenure
effect on cabinet service.
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New and Established Political Dynasties
In this section, I describe how juniors from dynasties differed from
other MPs. Junior dynastic status cannot cause other personal character-
istics determined at birth (such as gender), nor can we causally identify
an effect on certain career factors that were determined later. Neverthe-
less, the associations presented below can offer a better insight into who
these political families were and what mattered for their political careers
to succeed. To differentiate between different types of families, two
additional variables are considered. More relatives is a dummy for MPs
who had at least two previous relatives in parliament. A continuous vari-
able family experience measures the previous experience in an MP’s
family at ﬁrst entry, in parliamentary terms.
In Table 5, we can investigate some personal characteristics. The
sample used in these models is no longer restricted to marginal
electoral competitions before 1918. In other words, we can now inves-
tigate the association with gender, for example, as women were not
allowed to run for parliament in the 19th century. In fact, even when
still including in the analysis these years in which women were not
yet allowed to run, we are able to identify a positive, signiﬁcant asso-
ciation between junior dynastic status and a dummy variable female.
Among juniors, there were about 2% more women than among other
MPs, and this association is statistically signiﬁcant. This result is sub-
stantive, given that only 3% of MPs since 1832 were women. This
result is broadly suggestive of the idea that it has been easier for wom-
en to enter parliament as a member of a political dynasty. More
relatives is not a signiﬁcant predictor, while more parliamentary expe-
rience in the family is negatively associated with an indicator for
women. While political dynasties may have been useful to women to
break into traditional patterns of political power, they seem to have
been valuable to aristocrats as well in defending their traditional claim
to power. Junior dynastic members are found to be signiﬁcantly more
likely to have held links to the aristocracy,17 particularly if they had
several previous relatives and more experience in the family. This
underlines how political dynasties are symptomatic of aristocratic
establishment in the United Kingdom. However, juniors are also more
likely to have held university degrees, and degrees from Oxford or
Cambridge in particular. These results could be interpreted as signals
of their more traditional, elite backgrounds or of how political dynas-
ties may be preferred by the public because of perceived political
talents shared in the family, which could be associated with a higher
likelihood to attend university.
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While these associations should be interpreted cautiously as these
characteristics are strongly correlated, they are in line with the expecta-
tion that more relatives and family experience form good proxies of the
more established families. Therefore, I now revisit the main results of
the article to test whether tenure has a different effect for these different
family types. The results are presented in Table 6. Again, the coefﬁcients
on win are not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% or 2.5% margin. There is
also little evidence for a differential effect for narrow winners from polit-
ical dynasties with additional previous relatives or with more extensive
family experience (the interaction effects). However, the estimated coef-
ﬁcients of the number of seniors and family experience are large and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all speciﬁcations. In other
words, being part of an existing and established political dynasty made
an MP much more likely to continue the dynasty, regardless of whether
his or her narrow re-election resulted in a win or a loss.
TABLE 6
Heterogenous Effects for Family Types 1837–1910
Senior 5% 2.5%
Win 0.001
[0.031]
20.0002
[0.030]
20.005
[0.032]
20.009
[0.047]
20.010
[0.046]
20.029
[0.047]
Win 3 Junior 0.047
[0.083]
0.046
[0.108]
0.052
[0.089]
0.101
[0.122]
0.021
[0.143]
0.104
[0.130]
Junior 0.361***
[0.064]
0.156**
[0.078]
0.272***
[0.068]
0.354***
[0.088]
0.186*
[0.100]
0.253***
[0.093]
Win 3 More relatives 20.054
[0.138]
0.066
[0.189]
More relatives 0.443***
[0.098]
0.382***
[0.137]
Win 3 Family exp 20.001
[0.001]
20.003*
[0.002]
Family exp 0.005***
[0.001]
0.007***
[0.002]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Juniors incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 682 682 682 376 376 376
Note: Reduced-form estimation results of regressing senior on winning interacted with junior,
more relatives (juniors with at least two previous relatives) and family experience (in number
of parliamentary terms before first entry). Sample includes winners and losers of marginal
seats only. Controls as in Table A3. All models include parliament and region fixed effects.
Errors clustered at (broad) constituency level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Political Networks and Cabinet Selection
This section considers whether cabinet selection could have formed
an alternative mechanism to parliamentary service in explaining dynastic
TABLE 7
Cabinet Selection and Family Types
Ever Cabinet 1837–1910 1918–2005
Junior 20.002
[0.007]
20.018*
[0.010]
0.031
[0.018]
0.023
[0.024]
0.065***
[0.018]
0.027
[0.024]
Junior 3 with Senior
Cabinet Minster
0.078***
[0.020]
0.074
[0.068]
0.216***
[0.045]
0.358***
[0.108]
Junior 3 with Senior
Cabinet Minster after 1918
0.210***
[0.067]
0.314***
[0.124]
More relatives 20.001
[0.015]
20.016
[0.040]
20.010
[0.039]
More relatives 3with
Senior Cabinet Minster
20.069
[0.074]
20.213*
[0.127]
More relatives 3with Senior
Cabinet Minster after 1918
20.158
[0.162]
Family exp 0.001
[0.001]
20.001
[0.001]
0.001*
[0.001]
Family exp 3with Senior
Cabinet Minster
0.0003
[0.001]
0.002
[0.001]
Family exp 3with Senior
Cabinet Minster after 1918
20.001
[0.001]
Female 0.025
[0.022]
0.023
[0.022]
Aristocrat 0.037***
[0.011]
0.024
[0.021]
0.027
[0.021]
University degree 0.014
[0.010]
0.028***
[0.010]
0.028***
[0.010]
Oxbridge 0.031***
[0.012]
0.046***
[0.013]
0.046***
[0.013]
Age 20.0003
[0.0003]
0.0002
[0.0004]
0.0001
[0.0004]
Constant 0.041***
[0.003]
0.085***
[0.026]
0.070***
[0.004]
0.034
[0.023]
0.070***
[0.004]
0.044
[0.023]
Occupations No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,578 4,096 4,481 3,911 4,481 3,911
R-squared 0.008 0.045 0.022 0.065 0.017 0.060
Note:Results from regressing ever cabinet (future cabinet status) on junior dynastic status. Robust stan-
dard errors. With Senior Cabinet Minister after 1918 indicates MPs who had at least one relative who
was a cabinet minister after 1918. The first two columns consider 1837–1910. The final four columns
restrict the sample to MPs who served after 1918 only. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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persistence. There is little evidence that junior dynastic members
were more likely to enter the cabinet at some point in their careers
(Table 7), except if they had a senior who had served as cabinet min-
ister before (columns 1 and 2). This effect increases still when
restricting the sample to the period after 1918 (columns 3 and 4) and
if we consider juniors of cabinet ministers who served after 1918
(columns 5 and 6). Juniors of senior cabinet members are more likely
to enter the cabinet compared to all members but also compared to
other juniors alone. However, among those with a previous relative
in the cabinet, there is no evidence that juniors from more established
families were very different from other juniors (see the interaction
effects with more relatives and family experience).
These associations should not be interpreted as causal effects. Sim-
ilar to the baseline estimate of serving longer, the estimated effects may
still suffer from omitted variable bias and overestimate the true effect.
Still, compared to the baseline estimates of the effect of serving longer
(in Table 1), the association between being a junior of a cabinet minister
and ever serving in cabinet is estimated to be much larger. Depending on
the speciﬁcation, relatives of cabinet ministers are on average 7% to as
much as 36% more likely to become a cabinet minister themselves,
which is much larger than the average probability for all MPs to ever
become a cabinet minister (about 6%, or 8% considering MPs after 1918
TABLE 8
Heterogenous Effects for Cabinet ministers 1837–1910
Senior of a Cabinet Junior
5% 2.5% 5% 2.5%
Win 0.007
[0.032]
20.007
[0.047]
0.018
[0.013]
0.016
[0.019]
Win 3 Ever Cabinet 20.187
[0.185]
0.173
[0.161]
20.104
[0.154]
0.073
[0.106]
Ever Cabinet 0.281*
[0.165]
20.165
[0.110]
0.150
[0.146]
20.094
[0.100]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 682 376 682 376
Note: Reduced-form estimation results of regressing senior and senior of a future cabinet
junior on winning interacted with future cabinet status. Sample includes winners and losers
of marginal seats only. Individuals were not juniors themselves. Controls as in Table A3. All
models include parliament and region fixed effects. Errors clustered at (broad) constituency
level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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only). This result suggests that political networks may have mattered for
career progression.
What evidence is there that such networks were more important
than narrow electoral selection? Cabinet selection itself is not random,
which makes it hard to answer this question. However, we can revisit the
main analysis to test whether tenure at least has a different effect for indi-
viduals who would serve as a cabinet minister at some point in their
careers. Table 8 again conﬁrms that winning re-election was inconse-
quential for the dynasty, while there is also no evidence for a differential
tenure effect conditional on serving as a cabinet minister. Yet at least in
the 5% vote margin, cabinet service does continue to form a strong pre-
dictor of starting a dynasty (column 1) regardless of the outcome of the
ﬁrst re-election.
Conclusion
This article considered the origins of the success of political dynas-
ties in the United Kingdom. Longer tenure length alone was not found to
matter as much in the United Kingdom as in the United States or Argen-
tina (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder 2009; Rossi 2015). I propose that this
is consistent with the different starting position of existing British elites.
The political-power bequest that occurred in the United Kingdom did
not include individuals who only narrowly won a re-election. In fact,
compared to other MPs who won or lost a narrow re-election, MPs with
more than one previous relative, regardless of whether they won or lost,
were more than 50% more likely to continue a political dynasty than oth-
er MPs. A comparison of all MPs since 1832 further showed that juniors
of political dynasties were more likely to be selected to a cabinet position
if they had a relative in cabinet before them. This cabinet selection effect
was not solely a 19th-century phenomenon.
Why did serving longer not increase dynastic prospects for the nar-
rowly re-elected in the United Kingdom? While the United Kingdom
and the United States were similar in terms of electoral system and aver-
age length of service in the 19th century, there were important
differences. Political dynasties of multiple generations and aristocratic
families in general were more proliﬁc in the United Kingdom than in the
United States around 1830. These established elites may have formed a
barrier to entry to ambitious and talented narrow winners. The tenure
effect identiﬁed in the literature is therefore likely to be conditional on
the informal inﬂuence that newcomers can wield in a given context. As
in the United States, juniors from existing political dynasties were more
likely to run in less competitive environments in the United Kingdom.
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Yet among closely comparable narrow re-election winners and losers,
family characteristics remained much more important than tenure in
explaining dynasty formation and even career advancement. Aristocrats
who lost re-election could move from the Commons to inheritable seats in
the House of Lords. Unlike in the United States, the franchise for men was
restricted and property based until 1918, though this article showed that a
widening of the franchise did not immediately improve dynastic prospects
for nonelite narrow winners. Therefore, the informal inﬂuence that new-
comers could hold seems to have been more independent from tenure in
the United Kingdom than in the United States. The absence of this local
average treatment effect of tenure could be related to differences in politi-
cal development of the competing parties, the nature of electoral
campaigns, local interests, and political machines, which future research
should study in more detail.
The broader conclusion from the surprising null result identiﬁed in
this article is that there is variation in the extent to which power is trans-
mitted within families in democracies. Researching what explains this
variation is crucial to better understand the democratic legitimacy of
dynasties.
Brenda Van Coppenolle <b.k.s.van.coppenolle@fsw.leidenuniv.
nl> is Assistant Professor, Leiden University, Institute of Political Sci-
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1. Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) and Querubin and Snyder (2009, 2013) estimate
positive returns to service in the United Kingdom and the United States, though Eggers and
Hainmueller (2013, 2014) ﬁnd little advantage for US legislators holding US portfolios.
2. The original data were collected and are described in more detail by Rush
(2001).
3. The biographical entries used to create the data set would not commonly
report reciprocal links.
4. Aristocratic connections are deﬁned as the son, grandson, or nephew of the
holder of a hereditary peerage or baronetcy—that is, hereditary knighthood—with a con-
comitant extension to womenMPs from 1918 (Rush 2001, 31).
5. Corresponding to about 25% of individuals of whom the surname occurs
more than once, but who are not listed as related.
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6. Information was publicly available if the individual was found to have aWiki-
pedia entry. The results are robust to recoding the checked individuals according to this
information.
7. Digitized information about MPs before 1918 as well as 19th-century elector-
al results was drawn from Craig (1989a, 1989b) as compiled and analyzed by Eggers
and Spirling (2014) and kindly made available by the authors for this project. Electoral
information for 1918 to 2001 was mainly digitized from Craig (1971, 1983, 1984) and
Rallings and Thrasher (1998).
8. These additional data were drawn from Stenton and Lees (1976, 1978, 1979,
1981).
9. The sample of MPs has been carefully checked. However, as the information
is drawn from biographies, some errors are likely to remain in the coding of individual
control variables. For that reason, all analyses present baseline results without individual
controls.
10. In recent years, for example, selection to the frontbenches has been found to
be more likely if policy preferences are closer to those of backbenchers (Kam et al.
2010), while the duration of ministers at least partly depends on characteristics ﬁxed at
entry (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2012).
11. See Lee (2008) and Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) for well-known examples
of the regression discontinuity design.
12. Biographical information is much more difﬁcult to ﬁnd for losing candi-
dates, especially for those who lost and never served. For a subsample of close ﬁrst
elections, I attempted to collect information for losing candidates who never served
using Wikipedia, Who’s Who, and The Times Guide to the House of Commons. For
the large majority of losing candidates, no biographical and/or family information at
all could be found.
13. Many constituencies in the 19th century elected more than one MP. These
constituencies were often abolished, merged, or split throughout the 19th century and
sometimes even revived in the 20th century. As many of these constituencies share a
common history of elections, the most conservative approach identiﬁes the greatest com-
mon boundaries of these related constituencies. Groups of constituencies were identiﬁed
employing information about mergers and splits (Source: www.leighrayment.com/com-
mons.htm). Whenever appropriate, the analyses cluster standard errors at these larger,
merged constituency units.
14. Estimations from both strategies can be used to compare to existing ﬁndings
in the literature. The reduced-form approach was adopted by Querubin (2015) to identify
a power-treatment effect of ﬁrst re-elections in the Philippines. The RD-IV approach is
similar to the one employed by Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder (2009) in their analysis of
political dynasties in the United States.
15. A difference from the approach of Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder (2009) is
that I employ only one instrument, winning a ﬁrst re-election attempt. Adding addi-
tional instruments (e.g., interaction terms of winning with personal characteristics)
can increase the precision of the estimate (see Angrist and Pischke 2009, 259–67).
However, the downside of this approach is that the instrumented effect is more difﬁ-
cult to interpret. Estimating the alternative speciﬁcation yields qualitatively similar
results.
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16. In contrast to clear evidence of electoral advantages for junior family mem-
bers, Querubin (2015) ﬁnds no additional advantages of winning a ﬁrst re-election
attempt and serving longer.
17. This effect remains if we restrict the sample to years after 1918; results not
presented here.
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